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1. Introduction 
Issues revolving around computer programs are an 
interesting field of research, since they represent the paradigmatic 
case of new products of human creativity made possible by the 
emergence of digital technologies. These have undoubtedly 
weakened the traditional legal set of rules that had hitherto governed 
creative products in the “paper era”. Software possesses two 
natures1: the “literary” one, the source code written by the 
programmer using one or more programming languages that can, 
albeit with some difficulties, be associated with the “traditional” 
written text, and the “technological” one, which provides 
functionality and industrial application. 
The software presents important aspects of heterogeneity 
compared to other intellectual works protected by Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs). Actually, it is a presentation of technical 
information, i.e. instructions given to a computer to perform its 
various tasks. Like other works protected by copyright, a computer 
                                                 
* This paper contains the post-print version of the refereed article “Looking for a 
Feasible Form of Software Protection: Copyright or Patent, is That the 
Question?” published in European Intellectual Property Review, Vol. 35, Issue 8, 2013, 
445-454 (the content is identical to the content of the published paper, but 
without the final typesetting by the publisher).  
I acknowledge my debt to the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law of Munich and the University of Trento (Technology Transfer 
Office) for the support received for my research. I would like to thank Prof. 
Roberto Caso, Prof. Laurent Manderieux, Prof. Giuseppe Bellantuono, Dr. 
Christian Heinze, Dr. Matteo Ferrari and Dr. Andrea Rossato for their valuable 
feedbacks, and Patrick McLoughlin and my longtime friend Eric Johnson, for the 
linguistic review. All errors remain my own. 
1 Actually the concept of “software” would cover much more than the simple 
“computer program”, since it contains other further components (program 
description, accompanying material, etc.). However we will use both expressions 
as synonyms in this paper, since we are focusing on the phenomenon itself going 
into the semantic details and differences only when and if it will be deemed as 
necessary. 
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program can be represented by means intelligible to human language 
(so-called “source code”) and is suitable to communicate (at least to 
an expert audience) ideas and information. In order to be used, this 
peculiar product needs to be decoded and understood by a machine 
(so-called “object code”). Unlike any other presentation of 
information, software is made available to users in ways (object 
code) which typically keep hidden the ideational and informative 
content. 
The choice made initially by the international legislator, and 
then gradually by more local ones, was to protect this new form of 
creativity through the instrument which until then had managed 
other forms of “humanity’s” creation: copyright. Debate regarding 
the benefits of copyright versus patents as the best form of 
protection has characterized years of doctrinal discussion2.  
What must always be kept in mind is that the chosen solution 
will have to be tested in the light of this simple but important 
assumption: preference should be given to the settlement that better 
ensures the promotion and dissemination of these new products of 
the technological development within the society3. 
Other forms of protection which may relate to software - 
often of particular importance in applicative scenarios - also deserve 
to be mentioned, although a deep analysis is beyond the scope of the 
paper. First of all we make reference to “trade secret”, which refers 
to any confidential business information which provides a firm a 
competitive edge; the unauthorised use of such information by 
persons other than the holder is regarded as an unfair practice and a 
violation of the trade secret. Another important instrument can be 
represented by “trademark”. This is generally composed of four 
basic elements: the name, the logo, the colors and the symbol (e.g. 
the apple of Apple, the horse of Ferrari or the Lacoste crocodile). 
The brand, therefore, is any sign capable of being represented 
graphically, particularly words (including personal names), designs, 
letters, numerals, sounds, shape of goods or the packaging thereof, 
                                                 
2 See G. Ghidini & E. Arezzo, “Patent and Copyright Paradigms vis-à-vis 
Derivative Innovation: The Case of Computer Programs, 36 IIC 159 (2005) 
(describing how patent and copyright law address the case of derivative 
innovation in the software market and the likely consequences that the 
coexistence of the two paradigms would have on derivative innovations). See also 
S.J.H. Graham & D.C. Mowery, “Software Patents: Good News or Bad News?”, 
in: R. Hahn (ed.), “Intellectual Property Rights in Frontier Industries: Software 
and Biotechnology” 45 (Aei Press, 2005). 
3 To begin with, an interesting analysis of the paradoxical evolution of software 
appropriation regimes is available in E. Harison, “Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Software Technologies. The Economics of Monopoly Rights and 
Knowledge Disclosure” 62-86 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Uk – Northampton, 
MA (USA) 2008). 
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combinations or shades of color, as long as they are capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one firm from those of 
others. The importance of brands is linked to the traceability of a 
product or service at a given source and the reputation that is 
recognized. As part of the software distribution features, the 
ensemble of functionality, interfaces, security, architecture and 
performance help create the user experience that is then associated 
with a particular source or project. The relationship between brand 
and quality is reflected in the trademark licenses area. Finally, there 
are forms of technological protection that heavily affect the 
enforcement of statutory or private (rectius, contractual) rules. From 
this perspective we can mention the Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) systems: this terminology identifies the most advanced anti-
access and anti-copy protection system available on the market, able 
to incorporate the copyright rules set by the copyright holder4.  
This paper focuses on the analysis of the two main forms of 
software protection: copyright and patent. From this perspective, the 
comparative study represents a pivotal methodology: European 
legislation will be the main point of reference for my research; when 
appropriate, details on the legislation of some European countries or 
of the U.S. model will be provided in order to compare different 
solutions. This will allow the main issues to be highlighted.  
Following this introduction, the remainder of this essay is 
organized into two sections. The first section will be devoted to the 
description of the protection of software through copyright, and the 
second through patent system. Finally, in the concluding part some 
considerations will be developed towards the proposal of a feasible 
system of protection. 
2. – Software and copyright protection 
Although of interest in its own right, I touch only briefly on 
the history of the development of copyright legislation on software, 
and I generally do not tackle the description of (economic and based 
on personality rights) justifications that lead to the use of IPRs. I 
                                                 
4 For an in-depth analysis, see R. Caso, “Digital Rights Management. Il 
commercio delle informazioni digitali tra contratto e diritto d’autore” (Cedam, 
Padova 2004) (digital reprint, Trento, 2006, available at the website: 
<http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00001336/>); P. Samuelson, “DRM 
{and, or, vs.}the Law”, 46 Comm. ACM 41 (2003); J.E. Cohen, “DRM and 
Privacy”, 13 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 575 (2003). 
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instead focus primarily on the discipline in force in the European 
Union context5.  
The regulative framework here is basically composed of two 
legislative interventions: first, the Directive 91/250/ECC of 14 May 
1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, then repealed by 
Directive 2009/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer 
programs (Codified version)6; and second, on general copyright law, 
the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society7. 
The origin of the debate that preceded the introduction of 
the Computer Programs Directive of 1991 was due to the separation 
between hardware and software that had raised the issue of the 
appropriate form of protection for software that could easily be 
copied without the author’s consent. Several solutions were made 
available: providing a framework specifically for this new product; 
protecting it through the patent system; considering it as a literary 
work and then protecting it under copyright law. When the debate 
on the form of protection for computer programs started in the 
1970s, the position of the international community, within the 
“World Intellectual Property Organization” (WIPO), was to 
recognize a sui generis right, able to cover all the specific 
characteristics of this new product of human creativity8. WIPO 
published its “Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer 
Software” for supporting countries in amending legislation in the 
field of software starting from 1978. These considerations were 
summarized in a 1983 treaty proposal that has never been adopted. 
This model, indeed, was at the end not the choice of the national 
legislators; on the contrary, the idea of using the traditional copyright 
began to prevail9. The European Commission started deliberations 
in 1985, at the time when the “White paper on the Completing of 
                                                 
5 As a point of reference for this part see C. Heinze, “Software als 
Schutzgegenstand des Europäischen Urheberrechts”, 2 Jipitec (2001), available 
at: <http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-2011/3082>.  
6 For further details see W. Blocher & M.M. Walter, “Computer Program 
Directive”, in: M.M. Walter & S. von Lewinski (eds.), “European Copyright Law” 
81-248 (OUP, Oxford 2010). 
7 For further details see S. von Lewinski, M.M. Walter, “Information Society 
Directive”, in: Walter, von Lewinski (eds.), “European Copyright Law”, supra 
note 6, at 921–1141. 
8 Regarding this part, see R.M. Hilty & C. Geiger, “Patenting Software? A Judicial 
and Socio-Economic Analysis”, 36 IIC 615, 619-622 (2005). 
9 As we will see below in that period the U.S. legal system was moving to protect 
software by copyright, definitively codifying this rule in the “Computer Software 
Copyright Act” of 12 December 1980. From a certain point of view, the 
European solution could also be seen as a kind of legal transplant. 
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the Internal Market” was published. At that time, several States had 
already taken steps to explicitly recognize computer programs as 
copyrightable subject matter (first Germany, with the Copyright 
Amendment Act of 1985, and the United Kingdom, with the 
Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act of 1985)).  
The solution based on copyright law prevailed both at 
international (art. 10(1) TRIPs; art. 4 World Copyright Treaty) and 
European (art. 1 (1) and recital 6 Dir. 2009/24/EU) levels. The 
regulation of software has special rules that differ from the general 
one (i.e. art. 1 (2) Dir. 2001/29/EC), which, however, remains 
always a “subsidiary scheme” for those elements that are not 
protected as computer programs. 
The starting point is the art. 1 Dir. 2009/24/EC: member 
States shall protect computer programs by copyright, as literary 
works, within the meaning of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Computer programs 
include their preparatory design material. 
The protection provided for in this Directive applies to: i) the 
expression in any form of a computer program (ideas and principles 
which underlie a computer program or any element thereof are not 
included in this protection); ii) a computer program when it is 
original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation; 
iii) computer programs created before 1 January 1993.  
The main issues are the following: definition of computer 
program including preparatory design material; no protection of 
“ideas and principles”; and requirement of originality. 
As to the first point, the Dir. 2009/24/EC does not offer any 
express definition; that is likely due to the fear of not immediately 
making obsolete the legislative choice. The meaning can be found in 
the case law of the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU). The 
CJEU Case BSA (C-393/09)10 set two main criteria: the object of the 
protection is the expression in any form of a computer program 
which permits reproduction in different computer languages, such as 
the source code and the object code11; the protection started from 
the moment when its reproduction would engender the 
reproduction of the computer program itself, thus enabling the 
computer to perform its task12. 
The protection is henceforth bound to the program code and 
to the functions that enable the computer to perform its task. This 
solution implies that there is no protection for elements without 
                                                 
10 Bezpecnostni Softwarova Asociace — Svaz Softwarove Ochrany v Ministerstvo Kultury (C-
393/09) [2011] E.C.D.R. 3 (BSA). 
11 BSA [2011] E.C.D.R. 3 at [35]. 
12 BSA [2011] E.C.D.R. 3 at [38]. 
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such functions (i.e. Graphical User Interface (GUI), or “mere data”) 
and which are not reflected in the code (i.e. functionality in itself is 
not protected, since there could be a different code that may be able 
to produce the same function)13. 
As cited, the copyright protection covers also the preparative 
design material: this mentions a “structure” or a “flow chart”. These 
materials should be capable of leading to the reproduction or the 
subsequent creation of such a program, respectively14. 
The second main point is represented by the famous 
idea/expression dichotomy: since copyright covers only the 
expression modality of an intellectual work, “ideas and principles which 
underline any element of a computer program, including those which underlie its 
interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive” (see art. 1 (2) 2 
Dir. 2009/24/EC). Only source code and object code of a computer 
program are forms of expression entitled to be protected by 
copyright. Other elements are not; for instance, the GUI does not 
enable the reproduction of the computer program, but merely 
constitutes one element of that program by means of which users 
make use of the features of that program. This apparently simple 
and easy to understand assumption gives rise to a whole array of 
problems. We refer, for example, to its application to program logic, 
algorithms and programming languages that is far from being devoid 
of criticality15.  
The third, and perhaps most problematic, element to be 
analyzed is that of originality. Art. 1 (3) of Dir. 2009/24/EC states 
that: “A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it 
is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to 
determine its eligibility for protection”. Nonetheless, there are at least two 
limitations, as state in BSA16: “where the expression of those components is 
dictated by their technical function, the criterion of originality is not met, since the 
different methods of implementing an idea are so limited that the idea and the 
expression become indissociable”; and an author must “express his creativity 
                                                 
13 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd (C-406/10) [2012] 3 C.M.L.R. 4,which 
explicitly decided this point. 
14 BSA [2011] E.C.D.R. 3 at [37]. 
15 Recital 11 of the Directive is clear on the point: “For the avoidance of doubt, it has 
to be made clear that only the expression of a computer program is protected and that ideas and 
principles which underline any element of a program, including those which underlie its 
interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive. In accordance with this principle of 
copyright, to the extent that logic, algorithms and programming languages comprise ideas and 
principles, those ideas and principles are not protected under this Directive”. This assumption 
is also confirmed in Case C-406/10, at. 39: “(…) it must be stated that, neither the 
functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files 
used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of 
expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250”. See 
Blocher & Walter, supra note 6, at 102-105. 
16
 BSA [2011] E.C.D.R. 3 at [37]. 
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in an original manner and achieve a result which is an intellectual creation of 
that author”.  The originality requirements could create several 
problems, since the understanding of this precondition to copyright 
protection was not uniform in all European legislations at the time 
when the discussion began. The text of art. 1 (3) means “originality” 
in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation, with no 
other criteria being applied to determine its eligibility for 
protection17. The requirement is therefore addressed if the program 
is not copied from another18. 
As regarding to the issue related to ownership of software, 
the general practice is stated by art. 2: the author of a computer 
program is the natural person or group of natural persons who has 
created the program or, where the legislation of the Member State 
permits, a legal person; if several persons participate in the creation 
of a program, the exclusive rights shall be held jointly by these 
persons. In the event that an employee creates a computer program 
following the instructions given by his employer, the employer shall 
have exclusive rights to that computer program. 
The holder of the rights on a computer program may do or 
authorise the following activities: the permanent or temporary 
reproduction of the program, or a part thereof; the translation, 
adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of the program; the 
distribution of the program (art. 4). The legal tool used for this 
authorisation is termed “license”. The Directive establishes another 
crucial restriction, namely “principle of exhaustion”: the distribution 
right is exhausted after the first sale of a copy of a program in the 
Community if such first sale has been made by the right holder or 
with his consent (art. 4 (c))19. 
                                                 
17 Recital 8 of the Directive emphasizes it: “In respect of the criteria to be applied in 
determining whether or not a computer program is an original work, no tests as to the 
qualitative or aesthetic merits of the program should be applied”. 
18 For a detailed analysis of originality requirement see Blocher & Walter, supra 
note 6, at 93–98. 
19 Member States have differently answered the question of to what extent 
contractual restriction of the distribution right may prevent the effect of 
exhaustion. The issue is even more problematic if we take into account the case 
of online transmissions. On this point see the last decision of the CJEU: Case C-
128/11 UsedSoft GmbH vs. Oracle International Corp., where the Court has stated 
that the user license agreement that a consumer, who downloads the copy of a 
program, concludes with a company receiving, in return for payment of a fee, a 
right to use that copy for an unlimited period represents a sale (not a license); 
then second acquirer of that copy and any subsequent acquirer are “lawful 
acquirers” of it within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24/EC. For 
further details see Y.H. Lee, “UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp 
(Case C-128/11) – Sales of “Used” Software and the Principle of Exhaustion”, 
43 IIC 846 (2012). 
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Some limitations apply to these exclusive rights (art. 5). A 
person having the right to use the computer program may make a 
back-up copy in so far as it is necessary for that use. This person 
may also observe, study, or test the functioning of the program in 
order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any 
element of the program without the agreement of the right-holder. 
Furthermore, the authorisation of the right-holder is not required 
when reproduction of the code and translation of its form are 
indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with 
other programs, provided that the following conditions are met: 
those acts are performed by the licensee or another person having a 
right to use a copy of a program; the information necessary to 
achieve interoperability has not previously been readily available; 
those acts are confined to the parts of the original program which 
are necessary in order to achieve interoperability. 
It is also possible to make recourse to general protection 
under copyright law. For instance, this is the case for subject matter 
not qualified as a computer program: GUI (see Case C-393/09); user 
manuals (Case C-406/10); the audiovisual component of computer 
games; and even programming languages and the format of data files 
(see Case C-406/10). From this perspective, various parts of a work 
will be protected under art. 2 (a) of Dir. 2001/29/EC, insofar as they 
contain some of the elements which are the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author of the work (see Case C-5/08)20. 
I devote this final part to a concise description of the 
copyright on software in the United States of America21. Some of 
the rules previously expressed are shared by this legal system. Below 
are some brief details with regard to the U.S. without, of course, any 
claim to completeness. Computer programs are protected as literary 
works under the definition stated in the Copyright Act, § 101, Title 
17 U.S.C (1976)22. After the approval by the Congress of the new 
                                                 
20 See Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) [2009] E.C.R. 
I-6569; [2012] Bus. L.R. 102. In order to complete the subject see a paper arguing 
against copyright protection for the non-literal elements of computer software: 
C. Heer, “The Case Against Copyright Protection of Non-literal Elements of 
Computer Software”, 18 I.P.J. 1 (2004/05). 
21 For further information of a general nature on this issue, see the following U.S. 
reference works: M.A. Lemley, P.S. Menell & R.P. Merges, “Software and 
Internet Law”, 4th ed. (Aspen Law & Business, New York 2011); R.P. Merges, 
P.S. Menell, M.A. Lemley, “Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age”, 
5th ed. (Aspen Publishers, New York 2010). 
22 Before the approval of the Copyright Act of 1976 the classification of the 
software in the context of works protected by copyright presented some 
problematic profiles. In the first interpretation, based on the wording of Title 17 
of the U.S. Code, as derived by the Copyright Act of 1909, a work that could be 
seen only with the aid of a machine could not be protected by copyright: see 
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rules, a special commission (“Commission on New Technological 
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)) was launched in order to 
investigate aspects related to the relationship between copyright and 
technological progress. The conclusions of this work were endorsed 
by the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980: it amended the 
discipline of 1976 and introduced rules specifically designed for the 
protection of computer programs. 
Copyright for computer programs prohibits not only literal 
copying, but also copying of “nonliteral elements”, such as the 
program’s structure, sequence and organization. These non-literal 
features can be protected only “to the extent that they incorporate 
authorship in programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from 
the ideas themselves”23. The graphics, sounds, and appearance of a 
computer program may also be protected as an audiovisual work; 
thus, copyright can be infringed, even if no code was copied24. The 
set of operations available through the interface is not copyrightable 
in the United States under Lotus v. Borland25, but it can be protected 
with a utility patent. In a case destined to make the history of U.S. 
copyright on software - Apple v. Microsoft26 - but with significant 
effects also on a global level, the court established that the look and 
feel copyright claim must demonstrate that specific elements of a 
user interface infringe on another work; then, a program’s particular 
combination of user interface elements is not copyrightable27.  
Several aspects may be examined with respect to the 
protection of copyright on software in case law. An issue that 
certainly cannot be forgotten here is the one related to the idea-
expression dichotomy: that happens especially when the defendant 
has done something more than copy the source or object code 
                                                                                                                     
White-Smith Music Pusblishing Company v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1 (1908). For 
further details see A. Rossato, “Diritto e architettura nello spazio digitale – Il 
ruolo del software libero”, 130-139 (Cedam, Padova, 2006). 
23 See Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), where the 
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test for identifying these protected elements 
has been proposed. This test is aimed at distinguishing copyrightable aspects of a 
program from the purely utilitarian and the public domain. 
24 See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir.1982). 
25 Lotus v Borland 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
26 Apple v Microsoft 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994). 
27 With regards to the so called “look and feel” test see Whelan Associates Inc. v. 
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., et al, 230 USPQ 481 (3rd Circuit 1986), dealing with 
the question whether, even if there was no copying of object code or source 
code, there could be copyright infringement in copying the “overall structure” of 
a program; Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control System Inc, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1566 (9th 
Cir 1989), focusing on the question of whether the structure, sequence and 
organization of the alleged infringement was the same as that of the plaintiff’s 
program; Lotus Dve Copr v. Paperback Software, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1241 (1992), taking 
into account the flow charts of the parties to determine whether there was 
infringement. 
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expression of the copyright owner’s program. The courts tended to 
favor the copyright owner. In one case, instead, the argument was 
successful: The Q-Co Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman28. The court denied a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from selling a 
program that was inspired by the program of the copyright owner in 
a case where the alleged infringer had taken a program designed to 
run on one type of hardware and had expended substantial effort to 
produce a program that would fulfill the same function on different 
hardware. Although the general structures of the two programs were 
very similar, they were written in different languages and employed 
completely distinct algorithms. Then, the court stated that the 
similarities “can be more closely analogize to the concept of wheels for the car 
rather than the intricacies of a particular suspension system (…) it was the idea 
that was used rather than its expression. Therefore, copyright infringement has 
not been established”. 
A peculiar aspect deserves to be emphasized: despite what 
happens in the context of continental copyright, the works that have 
not been fixed in any tangible medium of expression are not covered 
by the copyright protection (fixation principle).  
In the end, regarding the protection time, for works created 
after 1 January 1978, copyright, in general, lasts for a period of 
seventy years from the death of the author, or in the case of joint 
works from the death of the last of the authors of the work. In the 
case of works made for hire, as we will analyze below, protection 
runs for a period of ninety five years from publication or one 
hundred and twenty years from its creation, whichever comes first29. 
3 – Software and patent protection 
3.1 – Premises and legal framework 
The current European scenario in terms of patent protection 
of inventions implemented by computer programs is the result of a 
complex evolution influenced by many factors30. 
                                                 
28 Q-Co Industries, Inc v Hoffman 228 U.S.P.Q. 554 (SDNY 1985). 
29 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §302. 
30 Starting from a broader perspective, the patent system involves several, 
different treaties and conventions. For a general reconstruction of the regulatory 
framework, see D. Closa, A. Gardiner, F. Giemsa & J. Machek, “Patent Law for 
Computer Scientists. Steps to Protect Computer-Implemented Inventions” 4-8 
(Springer, Heidelberg 2010). N. HOPPEN, “Software Innovations and Patents. A 
Simulation Approach” 16-20 (ibidem, Stuttgart, 2005). As regarding to the last 
proposal (13 April 2011) by the European Commission of a “Unitary Patent 
Package” (then positively voted by the European Parliament on 13 December 
2012), and consisting of two acts: a Regulation on the European patent with 
unitary effect (Proposal of Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council implementing enhanced cooperation in the ar
 13
We described before that, when the sui generis protection 
was proposed at the International level, the U.S. legal system was 
moving to protect software by copyright. This (new) approach was 
codified both at the European level, through the Directive 
91/250/EEC (art. 1)31, and at the International level, via the TRIPs 
Agreement (art. 10)32, establishing that computer programs are 
protected as literary works in accordance with the Berne 
Convention.  
At the same time, however, the U.S. case law began to adopt 
a more permissive approach with regard to software patentability, 
announcing an increase in the number of patents granted in the 
1980s and 1990s. The new trend had an international echo in art. 27 
(1) of the TRIPs Agreement, which states that “patents shall be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology”. At the European level it influenced the European Patent 
Office (EPO)33 praxis, bringing it to adopt a less restrictive attitude 
in granting patents via the use of sophisticated legal interpretations34. 
                                                                                                                     
unitary patent protection, COM(2011) 215 final of 13 April 2011, as amended by 
council doc. 17578 of 1 December 2011), and an Agreement on a Unified Patent 
Court for litigation on infringements and revocation of European and unitary 
patents (Draft agreement on a Unified Patent Court and draft Statute, Council 
doc. 14750/12 of 12 October 2012)) see R.M. Hilty, T. Jaeger, M. Lamping, H. 
Ulrich, “The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern”, 2012, 
available at MPI Web site: <http://www.ip.mpg.de> (raising concerns about this 
last proposed Unitary Patent Package on three main headings concerning: the 
complexity of the regime, the imbalances in the system, and the lack of legal 
certainty for investments in innovation); see also M. Lamping, “Enhanced 
Cooperation – A Proper Approach to Market Integration in the Field of Unitary 
Patent Protection?”, 42 IIC 879-925 (2012); T. Jaeger, “Back to Square One? – 
An Assessment of the Latest Proposals for a Patent and Court for the Internal 
Market and Possible Alternatives”, 43 IIC 286-308 (2012). 
31 Art. 1, Directive 91/250/ECC: “In accordance with the provisions of this Directive, 
Member States shall protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary works within the 
meaning of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works”. As an 
implementation of these provisions within the Member States, see for example: § 
2 (1)(1) Urheberrechtsgesetz (UrhG); art. 1 (2) e 2 (8), law 22 April 1941, n. 633 
“Protezione del diritto d’autore e di altri diritti connessi al suo esercizio” (Italian 
Copyright Law). 
32 “Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights” (TRIPs), 
15 April 1994 in Marrakech (Morocco). 
33 The “European Patent Office” (EPO) plays a pivotal role, by granting 
European patents for the contracting States to the “European Patent 
Convention” (EPC), which was signed in Munich on 5 October 1973 and 
entered into force on 7 October 1977 (The official EPO Web site: 
<http://www.epo.org/>). The EPO represents the executive arm of the 
“European Patent Organization”, which is an intergovernmental body set up 
under the EPC. It provides a legal framework for the granting of patents via a 
single, harmonized procedure: a single patent application may be filed at the 
EPO at Munich, at its branches at The Hague or Berlin, or at a national patent 
office of a contracting State, if the national law of the State permits so. Currently, 
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Recording this troublesome difference in terms of legal 
certainty between the rule established by statutory law and practical 
application, at the end of the last century the European Union tried 
to advance the adoption of a directive that sought to address the 
question with greater transparency and rigor. With the proposal of 
the Directive COM/2002/0092 of 20 February 2002, the European 
Commission set itself the ambitious goal of harmonizing legislation 
on patents on computer-implemented inventions, making more 
transparent the conditions of patentability of computer programs, 
with respect to the not so often clear “case law” solutions35. This 
proposal was strongly criticized and challenged, especially by the 
open source community36. The text first received numerous 
amendments that have resulted in a new draft of 24 September 2003. 
The troubled history of the proposal continued when, on 18 May 
                                                                                                                     
there are thirty-eight contracting States. This Convention is further analyzed 
below. 
34 On this issue Hilty & Geiger, supra note 8, at 620 write: “It is probably the desire 
not to hinder European companies, in relation to their American competitors, that has 
motivated the European Patent Office progressively to adopt a less restrictive attitude”; and 
further: “the practice of the European Office is the cause of the legal uncertainty of the 
legislation of the member states must be adjusted to the existing practice”. See also P. Leith, 
Software and Patents in Europe, 9 (CUP, Cambridge 2007): “Board of Appeal 3.5.1 of 
the European Patent Office – which was given the workload for the relevant classifications – 
clearly took the view that the role of a patent office was to give protection to technological 
developments and that since such developments were happening in software control of hardware, 
they should be protected”. 
35 Hilty & Geiger, supra note 8, at 625, dealing with the definition of “technical 
character” write: “Nevertheless, at least the solution proposed in the directive had the 
advantage of being clear, which cannot be said for the jurisprudence on this point”. For further 
analysis see, ex plurimis, W. Tauchert, “Patent Protection for Computer Programs 
– Current Status and New Developments”, 31 IIC 812 (2000); A. Laakonen & R. 
Whaite, “The Epo Leads the Way, but Where to?”, 2001 EIPR 244. 
36 For an analysis of the proposal and of the arguments of proponents and 
detractors of software patentability see S. Bisi, “Gli aspetti giuridici della tutela 
brevettuale del software”, 2005 Ciberspazio e dir. 423, 435-442. More specifically, 
the criticisms that the Open Source (OS) movement aimed at software patents 
can be based on the following assumptions: the inadequacy of patent instrument 
in a sector with high technological content where innovation is incremental; the 
possibility that an overarching technical standard patent is an obstacles to OS; the 
pursuit of purely economic interests made by large software companies through 
the so called “cross-licensing”; the possibility that the results emerging from the 
OS world come to be prey to illegitimate appropriation by patent applications: see 
M. Välimäki, “A Practical Approach to the Problem of Open Source and 
Software Patents”, 2004 EIPR 523. On the OS phenomeno in general, see H.J. 
Meeker, “Open Source Alternative: Understanding Risks and Leveraging 
Opportunities” (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken (New Jersey), 2008); L. 
Rosen, “Open Source Licensing. Software Freedom and Intellectual Property 
Law” (Prentice Hall, Saddle River (New Jersey), 2005). An interesting analysis of 
the emerging “Open Patenting” (OP) phenomenon within the boundaries of OS 
can be found in M. Maggiolino & M. Lillà Montagnani, “From Open Source 
Software to Open Patenting – What’s New in the Realm of Openness?”, 42 IIC 
804-824 (2011). 
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2004, the Council of Ministers decided not to take into account most 
of the work done by Parliament and to resume almost completely 
the original proposal. After a controversial debate on 6 July 2005, 
the European Parliament rejected, with a large majority, the proposal 
to adopt the directive on computer software, most likely determining 
the death of such a legislative initiative37. 
The following section will be devoted to providing a 
comparative investigation in order to determine the characteristic 
features of the patentability systems of computer-related inventions 
in some jurisdictions and institutions of reference (EPO and United 
States). When deemed appropriate, the discussion will be enriched 
through references to case law.  
3.2 - The comparative survey 
In this section I will give ample space to the discussion and 
description of the system operating in the EPO, since it is relevant 
for our analysis profiled primarily on the European legal scenario. 
Dealing with the implementation among the European countries of 
the Munich Convention, I will pinpoint the main problematic issues 
arising from possible differences in the application of the “European 
Patent Convention” (EPC) principles within the different 
jurisdictions. The study of the U.S. experience will be useful as it will 
provide the reference characteristics of a legal system that has 
influenced, and continues to strongly influence, rules and solutions 
on this peculiar issue38. 
Talking about software patentability within Europe, it is 
crucial to deal with the regulation set by the EPC and by the 
interpretations of its articles that EPO has offered39. Starting from 
the general requirements for patents, they are defined in art. 52 (1) of 
EPC: “European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all field of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
susceptible of industrial application”. The most relevant paragraphs for 
our research of this provision are the second, point 3,  and the third 
                                                 
37 See Hilty & Geiger, supra note 8, at 621-622. 
38 For further details on the comparative survey see: Closa, Gardiner, Giemsa & 
Machek, supra note 25, at 20-30 (with some interesting references also to the 
Japanese patent system); M. Ranieli, “Cronache in tema di brevettabilità delle 
invenzioni software related con particolare riguardo al ruolo dell’EPO e alla più 
recente giurisprudenza del Regno Unito”, 2009 Riv. dir. industriale, I, 233; D-H. 
Koo, “Information Technology and Law. Computer Programs and Intellectual 
Property Law in the US, Europe, Japan, Korea” (Pakyoungsa, Seoul  2005); N. 
Hoppen, “Software Innovations and Patents” 21-92 (ibidem, Stuttgart 2005).  
39 As main references for this part see: Ranieli, supra note 33, at  233-246; 
Hoppen, supra note 33, at 54-74; Closa, Gardiner, Giemsa, Machek, supra note 
25, passim; K. Beresford, “Patenting Software Under the European Convention” 
(Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London, 2000). 
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one: “The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the 
meaning of paragraph 1: (…) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental 
acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers” and 
“Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter or activities 
referred to therein only to the extent to which a European patent application or 
European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such”.  
The exclusion from patent protection is not made, then, in 
terms of absoluteness, but is instead relative: it is limited to the case 
where the claims contained in the patent application relate to the 
categories excluded “as such”. This prohibition leaves open the 
possibility of a more or less restrictive reconstruction of the 
requirements of patentability of inventions implemented by 
computer programs. Thus, the meaning given to the “technical 
character” of the software assumes considerable importance. 
Although this requirement is not expressly required by any 
provision, it is widely believed to be a common element 
characterizing the patentable inventions40.  
At the application level, it is obviously the EPO, when 
processing the examination, that has had the opportunity to deal 
with the interpretation and application of art. 52. What is quite 
interesting for our purpose is not only the decisional practices of the 
Office, but also the case law of the “Technical Board of Appeal” 
(TBA), internal office boards of appeal. We will provide a brief and 
quick outline of the more relevant ones41. 
The first argued application of article 52 EPC is recorded in 
the Vicom decision (1987)42. Here the Board finds evidence to 
discriminate the inventions consisting of mere computer programs 
from those which may instead receive patent protection on the so 
called “technical contribution”, made by the invention to the state of 
the art. Thus, not all software should be considered excluded from 
patenting: the distinction is made based on the effect of the 
invention. The result of the invention must therefore be taken into 
account for assessing whether it achieves a transformation of a 
physical entity or is confined to expose a further mathematical 
value43.  
                                                 
40 See G. Paterson, “The European Patent System. The Law Practice of the 
European Patent Convention” 9-13 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2001). 
41 For an excursus of EPO cases, at first glance, see Hoppen, supra note 33, at 66-
74; Ranieli, supra note 33, at 243-246. 
42 T 208/84 (Computer-related invention/VICOM, OJ 1987, 14). 
43 This interpretation received an extensive (and in some respects exaggerated) 
reading. It was thus argued that the “technical contribution” could be satisfied 
with the claim of a physical entity “incorporating” the program: hence the praxis 
rule of patent applications of claiming, not the software as a product, but as a 
part of an apparatus or as a mechanism of a larger process. See also Hilty & 
Geiger, supra note 24, at 623-630. 
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This interpretation, however, has recently been overturned. 
Since 2000, there is in fact a new “case law” of TBA that 
reemphasizes the importance of assessing the contribution or 
technical effect of the invention, for the benefit of the application of 
discriminating criterion of “inventive step”44. This specifically 
happened in three main cases which have laid the foundation for a 
new interpretative approach called “the any hardware approach”. In 
the Pension Benefit decision, the Board established that: “There is no 
basis in the European Patent Convention for distinguishing between “new 
features” of an invention and features of that invention which are known from the 
prior art when examining whether the invention concerned may be considered to 
be an invention within the meaning of Article 52 EPC. This there is no basis 
for applying this so-called contribution approach for this purpose”45. In the 
following Hitachi/Auction Method decision, the Board admitted that 
an application that includes any technical means has, for that reason, 
technical character and cannot be excluded from patenting. This 
interpretation was not deemed too extensive, and (then even 
potentially) harmful, since it was still necessary that the invention 
meets other decisive tests, for example, to be new, a solution not 
obvious to a technical problem, or capable of industrial application. 
The non-obviousness of the invention was summed up in the 
“inventive step”46. The last case that deserves mention is the 
Microsoft/Data transfer with expanded clipboard formats, where the TBA 
finally argues that: “The computer program recorded on the medium is 
therefore not considered to be a computer program as such”47.  
The practice of the EPO has therefore resulted in the 
granting of European patents on software itself, as considered and 
claimed; that is, actually, a recognition of the possibility of patenting 
software as a product48. 
The contracting States of EPC have implemented the 
contents through national laws which, in turn, have transferred to 
the domestic laws the ambiguous drafting of article 52 of the 
Convention. For instance, Italy has implemented the Munich 
Convention with the d.p.r. n. 338/1978; in particular article 12 of 
r.d. 29 June 1939, n. 1127 (today art. 45 legislative decree 10 
February 2005, n. 30 “Codice della proprietà industriale (Italian 
                                                 
44 Hilty & Geiger, supra note 8, at 628: “(…) legal doctrine often suggests that this 
condition is the most appropriate to prevent an “inflation” of patents in the field of software”. 
45 T 931/95 (Controlling pension benefits system/PBS PARTNERSHIP). 
46 T 258/03 (HitachiAuction Method). On the risks of too broad an interpretation 
the Board says: “the requirement for the claims of a patent application to relate to an 
‘invention’ having technical character is just one test which must be passed to obtain grant of a 
valid patent. The invention must also be new, represent a non-obvious technical solution to a 
technical problem and be susceptible of industrial application”. 
47 T 424/03 (Microsoft/Data transfer with expanded clipboard formats). 
48 Ranieli, supra note 33, at 246.  
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Industrial Property Act)) has been modified in order to adapt the 
content to art. 52 EPC. The Italian legislator has kept unchanged the 
text of this latter article in order to avoid the risk of different 
national interpretations from those that may be credited to the 
European level. Even if Germany has developed its own practice on 
software patents (although mainly in line with that adopted by the 
EPO), we find in this legal system almost the same approach to the 
implementation of European legislation49. The topic of patentability 
of software is defined in § 1 of the Patentgesetz (as amended by the 
Law of 31 July 2009): “Patents shall be granted for inventions in any 
technical field if they are novel, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of 
industrial application”. The second paragraph is dedicated to exclusion: 
“In particular, the following shall not be regarded as inventions within the terms 
of subsection (1): 1. discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 2. 
aesthetic creations; 3. schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, 
playing games or doing business as well as programs for computers; 4. 
presentation of information”. Actually this exclusion works “only when 
protection is sought for said subject matters or activities as such” (§ 1 (3)). The 
interpretation of the term “as such” has obviously raised many 
problems. In a decision of the federal patent court 
“Bundespatentgericht” (BpatG) “software as such” has been defined as 
a program that is “not directly associated with its functional execution” in 
connection with hardware50. Analyzing the several patent 
requirements, the most relevant one appears to be the “industrial 
application”. This is what, with respect to software, becomes the 
previously mentioned “technical character”. In an attempt to elicit a 
proper explanation, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 
stated: “(…) Patent protection is available for a method describing a methodical 
action using of controllable physical forces to attain a visibly obvious effect obvious 
success without interposition of human intellectual activity”51. 
The risk that uneven interpretations and applications become 
established in national law is particularly felt52. First of all, a difficult 
situation could arise if the European patent, in the case of a dispute, 
were to be submitted to a court of a designated member State. Since 
the national court is not bound to comply with the interpretation of 
EPO, it could consider the patent void, since it lacks the 
requirements for patentability or because the case falls among 
unpatentable situations. Another problem could be represented by 
the case in which a computer program inventor, rather than applying 
                                                 
49 For an overview of German cases, see F. Rummler, “Computer Program 
Inventions Before the German Courts – A Review”, 36 IIC 225 (2005); Hoppen, 
supra note 33, at 38-54 (for a studying between 1977 and 2003). 
50 BatG GRUR 1989, 42 – Rollandensteuerung. 
51 BGH GRUR 1969, 672 – Rote Taube. See Hoppen, supra note 33, at 24. 
52 See as reference paper for this part Ranieli, supra note 33, at 247-250. 
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for a European patent, directly asks for one or more national patents 
in the countries participating in the Convention. In this case, each 
patent office would grant or deny the request based on its 
interpretation of the prohibition in art. 52 EPC, leading to the 
possibility that the same patent application could have negative or 
positive results in various offices. Finally, were the inventor to assess 
the costs and risks of choosing where to apply for a patent and 
accordingly be orientated towards the EPO or to the more 
“complacent” national offices, the negative effects of a situation of 
objective legal uncertainty would be transferred to him. 
This is the European legal scenario. We are now going to 
outline the main features of the U.S. patent system with respect to 
software patentability53. From a general point of view, the “United 
States Patent and Trademark Office” (PTO) has the power to 
process the patent filing and to manage the procedure for granting 
the protection. The issue is regulated first of all by Title 35 of the 
United States Code. The requirements for patenting are established 
by §§ 100-105. In particular § 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title”. The criteria for granting a 
patent can be summarized as follows: the person is the inventor (§ 
102); the invention is the proper subject-matter for a patent: 
machines, articles of manufacture, composition of matter, and 
processes (§ 101); the invention is “useful” and new” (§ 102) and 
“unobvious” (§ 103). It is worth mentioning that there are no 
explicit prohibitions like those in the EPC system (and then, 
generally speaking, in the European Countries)54. Regarding 
software, at the beginning of its history, in the 1970s, the dominant 
                                                 
53 As reference for the U.S. analysis see A.K. Rai, J.R. Allison & B.N. Sampat, 
“University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First Examination”, 87 North 
Carolina L. Rev. 1519 (2009), in part. 1526-1529; Hoppen, supra note 32, at 74-
91. The debate over the extent to which software patents are likely to foster 
innovation is quite relevant in the U.S.: see J. Bessen & R. Hunt, “An Empirical 
Look at Software Patents”, 16 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 157 (2007) (where the 
authors argue that software patents are substitutes for research and 
developments); R. Mann, “Do Patentes Facilitate Financing in the Software 
Industry”, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 961 (2005) (where the commentator argues that 
software patents may push certain kinds of small software houses to attract 
financing). 
54 The statutory subject matter has always been considered as to “include anything 
under the sun that is made by man”: this expression has been used originally by the 
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 act (see S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 
(1952). Since then the Supreme Court has often used it with respect to any 
dispute regarding the patentability of certain dubious products: see Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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intellectual property regime was copyright55. In this regard, we 
mention a famous case, dealing with a computerized method for 
converting decimal numbers to binary numbers, in which the 
Supreme Court seemed to reject software as patentable subject 
matter on the grounds that patent law did not encompass abstract 
scientific or mathematical principles: Gottschalk v. Benson56. In the 
amendments themselves to the Copyright Act of 1976 of several 
years later, Congress expressly endorsed copyright as an appropriate 
protection regime for software. The interpretative turn occurred in 
the 1980s. In Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court provided its first, 
clear indication of the fact that certain types of software-
implemented inventions could be patentable57. The case dealt with 
the possible patentability of a rubber-curing process that used 
software to calculate cure time. According to Diehr, mathematical 
formulas in the abstract are not eligible for patent protection, but if 
the invention as a whole meets the requirements of patentability, and 
thus involves “transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing”, 
then it is patent-eligible, even if it includes a software component. 
This test has been subsequently commonly used by other courts58. 
The message was clear: software could be patented, but it had to be 
claimed as “something else”59. The key turning point happened in 
1994, due to In re Alappat60. The Federal Circuit eliminated any kind 
of limitation on patenting software by arguing that subject matter 
criteria could be met by claiming software as a new machine, when it 
has been loaded on a computing device. This decision gave way to a 
series of positions taken in accordance with the point. In 1996, the 
PTO issued software guidelines that broadly allowed software as 
patentable whether it was claimed as a machine or a process61. In 
1998, the Federal Circuit rejected any special subject matter test for 
                                                 
55 See P.S. Menell, “An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Application Programs”, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045 (1989). 
56 Gottschalk v Benson 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
57 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
58 See for instance Arrhythmia Research Tech, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
59 See A.K. RAI, J.R. ALLISON, B.N. SAMPAT, University Software Ownership and 
Litigation: A First Examination, 87 North Carolina L. Rev. 1519, 1528 (2009) 
(available also at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=996456 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.996456>). Time by time copyright was 
becoming less attractive than the patent option and in the 1990s several appellate 
court decisions clarified that copyright was covering first of all the literal source 
code of the program: see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F3d 807 (1st Cir. 
1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Computer Ass’n Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 692 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
60 In re Alappat 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
61 See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7, 478 
(Feb. 28, 1996). 
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software in State Street v. Signature Financial, stating that software (like 
all inventions) is patentable if it produces a “useful” result62. 
Generally speaking, the approach to software patenting in the U.S. 
seems to be broad and lacking any real obstacles to interpretation. 
Trying to pull the strings of this rapid comparative excursus, 
software is from a legal-dogmatic point of view excluded from the 
list of patentable inventions in the European context (see art. 52 (2) 
EPC), but broadly allowed in the U.S., where such an exclusion list 
does not exist in the statutory law. Despite these legal constraints, 
software patents have been and continue to be commonly granted in 
Europe, when, as seen above, a strong technical character could be 
demonstrated. It is clear how this additional legal discrepancy 
between the two sides of the Atlantic causes problems and costs that 
have a direct impact on investment strategies and, henceforth, on the 
possibility of future development and innovation. 
4. Conclusion: pros, cons and real rationale of IPRs on 
software 
I do not claim to provide any definitive answers with respect 
to the age-old question of the correct form of software protection. I 
wish to highlight some reference principles that should characterize, 
and influence, the legal regime in this particular field of application.  
Scholars and commentators have extensively debated 
potential advantages and disadvantages of intellectual property rights 
in the software area63. As is well known, copyright prohibits slavish 
copy of a particular sequence of program lines, but does not 
preclude that the same idea be carried out by a different author 
through the use of other instructions. Therefore, the new program 
could be similar to the previous one, since the programming 
language is necessarily “poor”, but it will still be protected if it is 
seen to be an expression of the intellectual work of the author. The 
important part of the software is its structure. What requires creative 
effort is not (or not always), in fact, the idea on which it is based, nor 
the function it will be called to perform. Rather, it is the particular 
order, the scheme and the economy with which instructions and 
cycles are expressed; that is, the form in which the programmer 
decides to express her ideas. The synergistic effect of combined 
protection of software as patent and as intellectual work covered by 
                                                 
62 State Street v. Signature Financial 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Circ. 1998). 
63 See an overview of the literature on this issues and a list of pros and cons in K. 
Blind, J. Edler & M. Friedewald, “Software Patents. Economic Impacts and 
Policy Implications” 7-34, 167-170 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK) – 
Northampton, MA (USA), 2005). See also J. Weyand & H. Haase, “Patenting 
Computer Programs: New Challenges”, 36 IIC 647 (2005). 
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copyright is still largely to be explored and certainly not a carrier of 
positive and simplistic legal regime. 
Patent protection, instead, insists on the content of the work, 
on the creative idea, and takes the form of the exclusive right 
granted to the inventor in carrying out the invention and subsequent 
profit from it64. The historical origins of patents are intrinsically 
linked to the nature of protected inventions: products that for their 
achievement involve great expenditures of time, money and energy. 
This represents a first problematic issue with reference to software. 
Currently it does not need, in general, large investments and its 
realization usually depends on the work of some capable 
programmers for a certain period of time. Furthermore, the creation 
of an invention traditionally presupposes the existence of a 
verticalized entrepreneurial structure; as regards the software, 
instead, especially with reference to Open Source models and within 
the “Internet age”, the production may be widespread. 
Dealing with this kind of problematic issues, we have always 
to bear in mind that intellectual property rights are only justified if 
they are able to address the function they are intended for and their 
use and scope should therefore be analyzed in relation to their task. 
When this is no longer carried out by the legal tool, then a serious 
danger of over-protection immediately arises65. Intellectual property 
in itself represents a remedy to market failures inherent in a system 
characterized by the circulation of the information good66. In fact, it 
establishes a monopoly in the hands of the author/inventor capable 
of determining artificially those obstacles to the free use and access 
by others to their work that are not present in the state of nature. 
Like all monopolies, it still represents a second-best solution, 
accepted simply because it is considered the only way to encourage 
and foster innovation. Within this context, it should be understood 
that the instruments historically provided by the legal order are able 
to activate the virtuous circle which leads to new creative works and 
                                                 
64 For an interesting social-economic analysis on software patentability see Hilty & 
Geiger, supra note 29, at 630-638. A discussion with much food for thought on 
the same issue is available in G. Floridia, La brevettabilità del software in Italia e in 
Europa, in Dir. ind., 2004, 421 (arguing that software invention and its exclusion 
from patentability as such are not worth preventing the patenting of the content 
of computer programs). See also J. Cohen, M. Lemley, “Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry”, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2001) (arguing that 
software patents may also be conceived as a system to bypass the expressive 
form/idea dichotomy typical of copyright). 
65 See Hilty & Geiger, supra note 29, at 618; C. Geiger, “Fundamental Rights, a 
Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Rights?”, 35 IIC 270 (2004). 
66 See R. Caso & G. Pascuzzi (eds.), “I diritti sulle opere digitali” 21-22 (Cedam, 
Padova 2002), and the references listed there; G. Pascuzzi, “Il diritto dell’era 
digitale” 199-249 (Zanichelli, Bologna 2010). See also M.A. Lemley, “Property, 
Intellectual Propertym and Free Riding”, 83 Texas L. Rev. 1031 (2004). 
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innovative ideas. The game is played fully on this aspect; software is 
a new matter on which to apply, in some respects, an old “legal 
arsenal”.  
From the point of view of patent, there are currently not 
enough empirical analyses regarding the impact on innovation of a 
wider software patentability.  There are, however, a number of 
uncertainties and the current patent system has been complex, 
expensive and too difficult to be used and enforced for small 
entities67. It can safely be argued that the patent system is currently 
not perfectly shaped and adapted to the peculiarities of the 
software68.  
Indeed, any attempt to adapt the tools that the current 
intellectual property system provides will never be completely 
satisfactory and suitable to the needs to which this new product of 
human creativity gives rise. As some scholars and commentators 
have argued, we should move towards a new form of protection, 
“somewhere between” today’s variously available protection systems. 
This idea is actually better than other more conservative versions 
which fail to understand that technological changes require a 
thorough reconstruction and recalibration of the “legal arsenal”69. 
This argument reflects the early vision of the WIPO, namely, the 
need for a sui generis right adapted to the present situation. What is 
needed is a system designed in such a way that represents and 
implements once and for all the basic assumptions on which the 
protection of proprietary ideas are based and, therefore, the claimed 
incentive of human creativity. Freedom is the prime mover in this 
context, both in terms of choices and in terms of content 
distribution for the benefit of all users, where these all, due to 
technological advances, more and more often become new creators 
themselves70. 
 
 
                                                 
67 Hilty & Geiger, supra note 8, at 631. 
68 In id., 639-642, the authors propose some practical and judicial adjustments in 
patent law. 
69 See, ex plurimis, P. Menell, “The Challenge of Reforming Intellectual Property 
Protection for Computer Software”, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2644 (1994); P. 
Samuelson, R. Davis, D.K. Mitchell & J.H. Reichman, “A Manifesto Concerning 
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs”, 94 Colum L. Rev. 2308 (1994); 
R.H. Stern, “A Sui Generis Utility Model for Protecting Software”, 1 U. Balt. 
Intell. Prop. L. J. 108 (1993); E. Galbi, “Proposal for New Legislation to Protect 
Computer Programming”, 17 J. Copr. Soc’y 280 (1970).  
70 Hilty & Geiger, supra note 8, at 646: “In particular, it is necessary to remind oneself of 
the fact that in a liberal society, freedom is the principle, and exclusivity the exception. In other 
words, any extension of exclusivity, to the disadvantage of freedom, must be justified and 
explicable”. 
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